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THE ROLE OF TAXES IN CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS: EFFECT OF TAX
SHIELDS ON THE CHOICE OF METHOD
OF PAYMENT
Ken C. Yook
George M . McCabe
Paul A. Shoemaker

Introduction
A persistent claim among academicians and politiciam alil-..e has been that
the merger wave of the eighties was fostered, if not caused, by certain benefits
to mergers in the tax laws. This study sheds light on that claim by mvestigating the impact of tax laws on the choice of payment medium.
In general, there are two types of potenual corporate tax benefits associated
with the combination of two companies: a) carry-over of tax basis and thus
tax losses and tax credit carry-forwards 10 the successor corporauon, and
b) stepping-up the basis of acquired assets to their fair market value. This
establishes a higher base for depreciation and prior to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA 86), taxation of the gain from the step-up could be avoided
at the corporate level.• The tax benefits available in a particular acquisition
vary depending, among other things, on whether the acquisition was for cash
(here cash is used to refer 10 any taxable considerations largely cash or debt)
or stock of the acquiring firm and on certain elecuons made by the two firms.
Previous studies on this issue have erroneously assumed that the acquiring
firm always obtains a stepped-up basis in a cash acquisition while It always
inherits the target's carryovers in a stock acquisition. 01 surprisingly, empirical findings to date regarding the tax effect on the choice of exchange
medium are not convincing. Harris, Guilkey, and Carleton ( 1982), for example, find that the coefficient on a tax loss carryforward measure i significantly negative at the 90 percent confidence level. This indicates that the
larger the tax loss carryover, the less likely the firm is to be acquired. This
would seem to say implausibly that the provision in the tax law allowing acquiring firms to utilize losses of acquired firms tends to mhibu mergers. Auerbach and Reishus' (1987) logit analysis failed to detect any significant
relationship between the type of payment method and the presence and size
of the tax benefits from the utilization of tax losses and tax basis step-ups.
In addition, two more recent works provide contradicting findings. iden
(I 988) failed to support the role of tax related factors in the choice of payment method. On the other hand, Crawford ( 1987) finds support for the impact of the size of potential basis step-up in the determination of the payment
mode but against the effect of the size of the target's carryovers.
These ~uthors have suggested that the inability to precisely measure such
tax benefits may be a major hurdle in detecting a significant relationship.
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However, as noted , a more critical problem is the misunderstanding of a part
of the tax code. The hypothesis that cash acquisitions must involve basis stepup and that stock acquisitions must involve carryovers is incorrect. \\ hile
it is true (as explained below) that stock acquisitions nearly always involve
continuation of tax basis and carryovers, the acquiring firm in a cash acquisition may elect either tax basis step-up or carryover of pre\1ous basis and
of losses a nd investment tax credits.
Thus , an acquiring firm may use either stock or cash to inherit the target's tax carryforwards, but use only cash to step-up the basis of acquired
assets. The empirical results of this paper shO\\ a marginally significant relationship between the target's potential step-up baSJS and cash payment but
no relatio nship between tax loss and credit carryforwards and stock payment.
This is weak evidence for the hypotheses that because the, can be obtained
under either a cash or stock acqu1s1t1on, net opera11ng loss carryo\'ers affect
the choice of payment mode only indirectly, v,hereas the Sile of potential
basis step-up affects the choice directly .2
The related tax codes are introduced in the ne,t section of this paper. followed by a description of the hypotheses, methodology, and sampling, a
presentation of the empirical results, and the conclusions.

o~enie\\'

To see ho\, the tax treatment of acquisitions affects the choice of payment method, 1t 1s important to l-..nO\\ ta,ation at the corporate le\el as well
as at the shareholders' level. At the shareholders' level, stock received in an
acquisition is ta\-free \\h1le cash and debt are taxable consideration.' \ 1 the
corporate level, the d1,tinc11on 1\ more comple, and, contrar} to the statements of previous authors, is only loosely related to iaxauon at the shareholders' level.
Taxation at the corporate level changed in 19 6 For rea,om e,plained
later, our ample was chosen from the period 1980 to 1986. Thus, we concentrate on the tax la\, in existence at the 11me. Changes 111,muted in 1986
are also explained. Also, \\e hint at changes b} discussing in the past tense
those pans of the pre-1986 la\\ that ha\e been changed and b, d1scu,sing,
in the present tense, those parts sti ll in effect.
Prior to TRA 86, taxes on the capnal gains resulting from the merger could
be avoided at the corporate level. 4 HO\\e\er, the structure of the transaction (form of payment a nd whether assets or stock of the target corporation
are purchased) determined whether the acquiring corporauon recei\ed immediate tax benefits 111 the form of tax credits and loss carryfon\ard , \\h1ch
could be used immediately, o r deferred tax benefits in the form of a higher
tax basis in the acquired assets, which resu lted in greater depreciation deductions in future years. There are four types of acquisitions: I) ca h may be
used to purchase assets, 2) cash may be used to purchase stock , 3) stock may
be used to purchase assets, and 4) stock may be used to purch ase stock . A
discussion of these types of acquisitions fo llows.
55

Table l
Taxability of Corporate Acquisitions and Basis of Acquired Assets
Effect on Target Corporatio n

Effect o n Acquired Assets

Type of
Acquisition

Taxability

Code Sections

Basis

Code Sections

Tax Benefit
Carryover
Provisionsa

Cash for Assets

Nontaxable

§336-§337

Stepped-up

§334(a)

None

Nontaxable

§336-§337

Stepped-up

§334(a)

None

Nontaxableb

§336
§332
§336
§332

Stepped-up

§338<

None

Carryover

§334(b)(l)

§38 1-§383

Cash fo r Stock
General ruleSpecial rule for
Subsidiaries-

Nontaxableb
Stock for Assets

Nontaxable

§368(a)( l )(C)d
§361

Carryover

§362

§381-§383

Stock for Stock

Nontaxable

§368(a)( I )(B)
§361

Carryover

§362

§382

aNet operating losses and investment tax credits.
bLiquidations of minority interests are taxable.
<This provision was §334(b)(2) prior to 1982.
dMay also be nontaxable under §368(a)(l)(A).

Cash for Assets
Transactions involving assets of the target corporation purchased w11h cash
were nontaxable to the target corporation under the authority of §336 and
§337 of the Internal Revenue Code ( IRC). Section 336, commonl; referred
to as the General Utilities docmne, forgave all tax recognition on corporate
liquidation except for certain LIFO valued inventories. Section 337 allo,\ed
for the distribution of assets to shareholders in a complete hqu1dat1on followed by a sale by the shareholders to another corporation, all tax-free to
the liquidating corporation. This 2-step sale minimized the overall tax burden to shareholders. It was generally applied by closely held corporations.
Under §337, the liquidation had to be completed w11hin 12 momhs from the
date of adoption of the plan. Section 337 nonrecognition did not apply to
inventories and most installment obligations. Sect1on 337 also did not apply
10 liquidations of collapsible corporation or liquidations of subs1d1arics under §332 (§332 is discussed in the next section of the paper).
Both §336 and §337 were subordinate to the depreciation recapture pro,isions under §1245 and §1250, as well as the investment ta, c.redit recapture
provisions under §47 (a) (I). Therefore, any gain resulting from some, or
all (depending on the nature of the asset), depreciation taken had 10 be recognized as taxable income. Also, some or all investment ta, credits claimed
in prior years had to be added to the ta, habilny 111 the year of liquidation.
Overall, while the objective of §336 and §337 was to provide tax-free treatment of liquidating corporations, a relat1\el; small poruon of the tran,action may have been taxable.
Under the authority of §334(a), the bases of the assets for the acquiring
corporation were stepped-up to their fair market , ·alues. Thi, allowed the
acquiring corporat ion to redepreciate the assets at ,atues higher than their
original cost.
Ca h for Stock
Transactiom involving purchases of stock of the target corporation \\1th
cash received the same tax-free and asset basis provisions as cash for asset
transactions. The transacuons were nonta,able under §336 and §337 and the
as et received a stepped-up basis 10 the acquinng corporation under §334(a).
If a corporation purchased at least 80 percent of a target corporauon'
stock and then liquidated it, the transaction was accorded treatment under
§332, liquidation of a subsidiary by a parent.S The nonta,able pro\is1on
of §336 applied to the subsidiary (target) and the parent had the option of
valuing the assets at fair market (stepped-up) under §338 or cost under §334
(b) (1).6
The §338 election could have been made by any corporation that acquired
a_ target corporation by purchasing at least 80 percent of the target corpora11on's stock within a consecutive twelve-month period. If thi election ,\as
made, the target corporation was treated as if it sold all its assets on the date
of acquisition of 80 percent control. Thus, this election provided for the ame
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..1.,-free treatment, except fo r depreciation recapture and investment tax credit
rl!\::apture, a, a purcha e of assets for cash and the same basis for assets acquired a, under a purchase of assets for cash, fair market value.
On the other hand, the §334 {b) (I) election provided for a completely taxiree tran~action. The depreciation recapture provisions under §1245 and §1250
and the in\'e tment tax credit recapture pro,1s1on under §47 (a) {I) did not
appl). However, the basis of the assets to the parent corporation were the
,ame 35 the ba i to the subsidiary instead of fair market "alue. This is called
a carry0\ er ba i .

~10ck for Assets

Tax-free purchases of assets with payment made by the issuance of stock
are treated a reorganiza11ons. Sect1on 368 (a) (C) (Type C reorganization)
d35,ifie tock for assets reorganiLal!ons. - In addiuon to demonstrating that
the form of the proposed transaction meets the literal statutory definition
of reorganizauon, the courts require that the sub,tance of the proposed tran action mu t pass under four Judicially imposed doctrines, namely, the busine,,, purpo e, continuity of interest, continuity of business enterprise, and
,tep transaction doctrines. A brief discussion of these requirements are: the
tran,action must have a bonafide business purpose other than the avoidance
of ta,: the stockholders of the acquired corporation must ha,e a substantial
continuing equny or proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation; there
must be a continuny of the bus mess enterprise under the modified corporate
iorm. and, a single composite transaction cannot be disguised as a series of
transactions [see George Brode, Jr. ( 19 3) for more discus ion].
Type C reorganizauons are tax-free to the target corporauon under §361.
Secuon 362 dictates that the acquiring corpora11on receives a carryover basis in assets acquired in Type C reorganization,. A Type C reorganization
..., hich fails 10 meet Its method of payment requirements (see footnote 6) may
nonetheless qualify as tax-free under §368 (a) (,\}(Type A reorganization}.
Type A reorganizations are statutory mergers or consohda11ons m \\hich the
method of payment for assets is somewhat relaxed. Type A reorganizations
enjoy the same treatment as Type C reorgamza11ons.

tock for tock

\ stock for stock 1ransac11on 1s a Type B reorganization under §368 (a)
<B). The same Judiciall1 imposed doctrine that a Type C must abide by
apply 10 Type B reorganiLations. These are tax-free reorganizations under
the same pro\1s1ons as the Type C reorganizations and the ba is of the assets
received take on a carryover basis equal to the basis in the stock acquired.g
The I RC is unclear about the relationship between §332, which allows the
acquiring corporation to receive assets at a stepped-up basis, and §368, which
dictates a carryover asset basis to the acquiring corporation. Section 368 is
generally considered paramount to §332. Therefore, if a tra nsaction qualifies under both provisions, it would be classed as a §368 reorganization under the step doctrine. The courts have established this in American
II)
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Manu facturing Co., Inc. (1972). However, the liquidation prov1s1ons of §332
have prevailed over §368 in at least one case, Kansas Sand and Concrete,
Inc. (1972).

Tax Benefits to Acquiring Corporation

The two major types of corporate tax benefits imply different determ111ants
for the payment method. The first of these benefits \,as the ability of the
acquiring corporation to receive assets at a basis stepped-up to fair market
value. The high market value cou ld then be used for depreciation generating
greater tax shields over the life of the assets. The dra\, back of enJoying a
stepped-up basis in assets was that the acqumng corporation could not carry over and utilize unused net operating losses (NOl ), capital losses, or investment tax credits of the target corporation under sections 38 I through
383.9 The second tax benefit was the ability of the acquiring corporation to
carry over and util ize OL's, capnal losses or 111vestment ta\ credits. 0 This
benefit could only be used if the acquiring corporation received a carr} 0\·er
basis in the a sets. In no case could a merger invohe both of these benefits,
There was one exception to the general scheme Just described. Section 368
(a) (I) (B) (Type B) reorganizations carried over OL's onh. All other ta,
benefits rema111ed \,ith the target corporation. The target corporation generally continued its existence after the reorganization and utili,ed m m, n remaining benefits.
Which of the two tax benefns of merger \\as recei\ed depended on the
form of the merger and applicable la\,, a, e\plained above The ke) point,
though, is that 111 a cash acqu1sn1on the acquiring firm could elect to obtain
either a stepped-up basi, or carry over of losses and credits

Changes Made b) the Tax Reform Act of 1986

TRA 86 made significant changes to the taxation of corporate mergers.
The changes will be brieOy highlighted
The General Utilities Doctr111e (§336), the pro\ 1s1on allowing ta\-frcc treatment to target corporations for the sale of their as,et, or stock for ca,h, was
repealed. Section 336 remains 111 the Internal Revenue Code, but n no\, calh
for taxation on these transactions Howe\er, §336 no longer apphes to subsidiaries (§332 transact ions). The o ld §337 ( 12-month hqu1datiom) was
repealed and replaced "ith tax-free rules for subsidiaries. As a result, the
liquidation of subsidiaries remaim tax-free, but all other liqmdat1ons are ta\able. These changes are effective for adoption of plans after July 31, I 986,
subject to some grandfather clauses.
o changes were made to §368 reorganizations. These transactions are ta\free as they were before TRA 86. The tax basis of acquired assets (steppedup or carryover) remains the same as before TRA 86 in all situations including the option for parents of liquidated ubsidiaries to choo e bet\~een
stepped-up or carryover basis.
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The tax benefit carryover scheme remains the same as before. However,
corporations allowed to use benefits of the target corporati?ns found their
benefits more restricted than before TRA 86. The tax benefit carryovers of
§382 and §383 were tightened. NOL carryovers, already limited for §368 reorganizations, are now limited for §332 transactions involving §338 elections
(liquidating a subsidiary with a stepped-up basis for assets). Tighter limits
were placed on capital loss and investment tax credit carryovers by changes
to §383. These changes are effective for adoptions after December 31, 1986.
Hypotheses, Methodology, and Sampling
Hypotheses
While it is true that stock acquisitions nearly always involve continuation
of tax basis and tax carryovers, the acquiring firm in a cash acquisition where
the target firm's stock is purchased may elect either tax basis step-up or carryover of previous basis and carryforwards. This implies that an acquiring
firm may use either stock or cash to inherit the target's tax carryforwards,
but may use only cash to be able to step-up the acquired assets. Thus, there
is a direct relationship between the target's potential step-up basis and a cash
payment, but contrary to previous studies, only an indirect one between tax
loss and credit carryforwards and a stock exchange. This argument leads us
to expect a positive relationship between step-up basis and cash payment,
but no relationship between carryover and the payment method that is:
but

dL/dTstep > 0
dL/dBTtax = 0,

where
L = Relative probability of choosing cash payment rather than
stock payment;
Tstep = Acquired assets' step-up basis potential;
BTtax = Bidder and target's carryforwards.
The possibility of the bidder's choice of cash payment is expected to increase with the acquired assets' step-up potential but is not expected to be
affected by target and bidding firm's loss and credit carryforwards. 11
When a bidder acquires a firm with a high tax basis, it can utilize the incre~sed depreciation deduction only if its taxable income is large enough.
This argues for the creation of an interaction variable of the bidder and target's combined profit and the target's potential step-up basis:
Tstep*BTprofit = Tstep X BTprofit
If the interaction variable has a significant coefficient and "Tstep" has
a_ n~nsig~ificant coefficient, we can conclude that the taxation effect hypothesis is vahd only if the bidder is able to fully utilize the possible benefits.
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In addi tion to not having enough profits, certain kinds of corporations
are more interested in the tax shelter from the increased depreciation deductions. Firms that have low tax shields, and thus can fully utilize the basis
step-up , are more likely to undertake tax-oriented takeovers. Such firms
would be expected to have low growth opportunities si nce low investment
in physical properties would tend to produce fewer tax shields. On the other
hand, firms with high growth opportunities and high tax shields would not
be expected to be concerned about such takeovers.
In this sense, the tax benefit of step-up basis leads to the conclusion that
low growth companies are more likely to use cash payment to utilize the tax
shield. The bidder's Tobin's q value is proposed as a proxy for growth opportunities. A high q value indicates high growth opportunities.
Another argument for the inclusion of q is that q proxies for a firm's over
or under valuation. A high q ratio may imply that management, at least,
doesn't feel the firm is undervalued and thus is more willing to use stock
in an acquisition. Thus, the probability of a cash merger would be expected
to decline with increases in q (dL/dBq < 0).

Methodology

In light of the discussion of tax codes, four determinants of the payment
method-tax loss and credit carryovers (BTtax), potential step-up basis in
the target's assets (Tstep), bidder' q ratio (Bq), and an interaction variable
between step-up basis and profit (Tstep*BTprofit)-are proposed.
Binominal logistic regression is used here to te t the proposed relationship. With qualitative variables which rule out multivariate normalit}, logistic
regression with maximum likelihood estimators is preferred to multiple discriminant analysis or traditional linear regression. The binary decision of
the ith observation can be conveniently represented by a random vanable
Y; that takes the value one if cash is used and the value zero if stock is used.
The logit model then takes the form:
log(P/ (1-P,)]

= a + b 18Ttax, + b 2T step, + b 3 Bq,
+ (b4T step,*BTprofit,)* + e,,

* Tstep and Tstep*BTprofit are used in separate regressions because of a
high correlation coefficient between them.
where

Tstep
Bq

Probability of the cash (stock) outcome;
Target and bidder tax loss and credit carryforwards, scaled
by the sum of market values of target and bidder equity;
Amou nt of step-up in target minus recapture tax, scaled
b~ the sum of ma rket values of target and bidder equity;
Bidde r q va lue;
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BTprofit = Bidder profit plus target profit, scaled by the sum of market values of target and bidder equity.
Sampling
The longest recent period of stability in the merger related portion of the
tax code was the period just before the TRA 86. Accordingly, our sample
was drawn from that period, 1981-1986. 12 The sample firms were selected
by examining the COMPUSTAT Industrial Research File for all delistings
caused by acquisition during the period. All delistings were confirmed in the
Wall Street Journal Index. Other criteria used for selection of data were as
follows: I) Data availability of both bidder and target firms on the COMPUSTAT files. 2) Acquisitions in which the medium of payment was known
and took the form of cash or stock exchange. 13 3) If the bidder's ownership of the target firm exceeded 500Jo prior to the takeover announcement ,
the acquisition was eliminated from the sample. 4) In cases where several
acquisitions were made by the same bidder, the bidder is counted separately
for each acquisition made. The sample includes only cases where no other
acquisition has occurred in the preceding one year.
The method of payment was identified from the Wall Street Journal. A
total of 488 was delisted from the COMPUSTAT during the sampling period due to acquisitions. Application of the above data requirements resulted
in a final sample of 167 acquisition events. Of the 167 events, 122 acquisitions used cash payments and the remaining 45 acquisitions used stock exchanges. The composition of the estimation sample is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Distribution of Acquistions by Year

or An nouncement

Year

Cash
Payment

Stock
Exchange

Total

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

7
20
II
16
22
24
22

7
5
12
6
5
4
6

14
25
23
22
27
28
28

Total

122

45

167

Empirical Results

First , we tested whether the difference of the individual variable's mean
across the two groups is significant. Sample means for each variable, for
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both the cash payment group and the stock payment group, are displayed
in Table 3. In addition, at-statistic is presented for the comparison between
the two sample means for each variable.

Table 3
Variable Means and Univariate Test Statistics•
Variable
BTax
Tstep
Bq
Tstep* BT profit

Cash
Payment

Stock
Exchange

0.068
0.130
(0.214)
1.420
0,025
(0.040)

0.026
0.076
(0.077)
2.138
0.014
(0.0 13)

Difference in
Means t-Statistics
1.524
1.674***
(2.366**)
- I. 900**
2.0 I 3**
(2.619)*

* Significant at the 0.01 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.10 level
a Number

in parenthesis refer to the truncated sample of firms \\ here data
on replacement co t were available and did not have to be e timated.
The I-statistic on the bidder-target tax loss carryover is not 1gnificant,
"hich is the outcome we anticipated. However, the performance oft he stepup variable depends on the method of measurement. The total step-up amount
on acquired assets i the difference bet\,een replacement cost of the acquired
assets and the adjusted basis of tho e as ets. We can obtain relati\el; precise replacement cost information for large firms (since large firms report
their e timated replacement COM on their 10-Ks), but \\e must rely on estimates for small firms' replacement costs (see Append!\). \\. hen \\ e use onl}
the data of the acquired firms \,hich report their replacement costs in a 10-K,
we find that the t-statistic on the ,tep-up ,anable is po ill\'e and ,ignificam
at the 0.02 level. ' 4 The mean of the cash payment sample is 0.214, \\hile the
mean of the stock exchange sample is 0.077. On the other hand, ,r we include the firm that do not report their replacement co. ts, the \'anable is
significant only at the 0.10 le\el. This may be indirect e,idence that this study,
as well as previous studies' failure to support the ta\ treatment hypothesis,
is partly due to variable measurement problems.
Further, the bidders q value has a significantly negati,e !-statistic at the
0.05 level, which is con istem with both the above arguments concerning the
relevance of q.
In addi tion, the interaction variable between the step-up ba is of acquired
assets and combined cash flow of target a nd bidder i positive and signifi63

cant at the 0.05 level, while the level improves to reach 0.01 when we use
only the data of firms which report their replacement cost. This is evidence
for the assertion that the acquiring firm can utilize the stepped-up basis of
the acquired assets only if the combined profit is large enough.
Next, we tested the proposed variables simultaneously. Table 4 reports
results from several logit models in which the dependent variable is zero fo r
stock payments and one fo r cash payments. The parameter estimates of the
logit models and the associated t-statistics are presented. Also presented in
the table are the pseudo-R2 for each version of the model which provides
an indication of the overall explanatory power of the model, and the likelihood ratio statistic that tests its statistical significance.15

Table 4
Estimates of Logit Models•
Variables

Model I
All
Firms

Model 2
Truncated
Sampleb

Model 3
All
Firms

Model 4
Truncated
Sampleb

Constant

1.4269
(3.757)*
1.1795
(0.854)
2.3608
(1.417)
-0.4018
(-2.281)**

0.8382
(4.363)*
1.1706
(0.920)
2.430
(1.347)

1.4737
(3.913)*
1.2406
(0.864)

0.8252
(4.307)*
1.2068
(0.933)

BTax
Tstep
Bq
Tstep*
Tprofit

•

-0.3994
(-2.252)**
8.2629
(1.281)

14.7003
(1.577)

Significant at the 0.01 level
Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.10 level

••

•The t-statistic, computed to test the null hypothesis that the estimated ·
coefficient is equal to zero, is shown in parenthesis for each coefficient estimate.
~Includes only those firms for whom data on replacement cost is available
m the 10-K and does not have to be estimated.
Wh_en we_ run the logit model with the estimated step-up variable for all
firms mcludm~ the firms which do not report their replacement cost in Model
1'. two tax variables, BTtax and Tstep, have statistically insignificant coefficients, but the coefficient of Bq is significant at the 0.02 level. When we used
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only the data of the firms which report their replacement cost in Model 2,
the significance level of the coefficient of Tstep improves a little, even though
that level is not statis11call> significant.
To test the hypothesis that the acquiring firm can utilile the stepped-up
basis of the acquired assets onl} 1f the combined profit 1s large enough, \\e
included the interaction variable in tead of Tstep. Model 3 (Model 4) 1s a
re-estimate of Model I (Model 2) \\tth the interact1on variable. The interac.
tion variable is very marginally significant in Model 4 at the 0.11 significance
level.
In sum, the coefficient of Bq is significant in all log11 models as well as
the univariate analysis above. Again, this is consistent wnh both theories ot
the relevance of q. The coefficient of BTtax t\ not significant in an; model,
which is also consistent w11h the hypothe 1s of this paper, 1 e , ta, lo\s and
credit carryforwards have little effect on the payment method. The coeffi
cient of Tstep has the correct sign but is not sufficiently stat1st1cally significant. However, the interaction variable between Tstep and BTprofil has a
marginall; significant coefficient when \\e used onl; the data of 1he firms
that reported their replacement cost.16

ummar)
While we venf} that the 1a, carryo\er , ariable (BTta,) does not affect
the choice of the payment method, we failed to pro,ide strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the target's step-up basis (Tstep) has a posn1,e
effect on the cash payments. As mentioned above, the inability to measure
such tax benefits precisely ma; be a cnt1cal problem In the uni, ariate anal
ysis, the t-statistic on Tstep is more significantly pos111ve when using the data
of replacement cost from a 10-K file than ,,hen obscnat1on \\ here est1mated
replacement cost was used are included In the log11 analysis, the coefficient
ofTstep 1s not significant regardless of the t;pe of data. Ho,\ever. the interaction variable between Tstep and BTprofit is marginally significant ,,hen
using that portton of the sample \\here replacement cost ,,as available and
didn't have to be est1mated.
All in all, these findings sugge t that \\e ma 1 not entirely reJect the assertion tha1 step-up baSIS in acquired assets affects the choice of cash payment
positively. The small et (61 firms) in the sample that reports 11s replacement
cost prevents further analysis w11h log1suc regression and support for the
hypothesis. Future research needs to examine thi measurement problem. A
study of the TRA 86 impact on the takeover emironment will al o be an
important issue to inve tigate in the future.
Interestingly, Bq carried the anticipated sign and was con istently significant. This may support either the argument that the growth opportumty of
the bidder is related lo the payment method or the argument that manager
use cash when stocks are viewed a undervalued. Further re earch on this
issue is also desired.
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Appendix
Definition of Variables
I. Gain from Use of Tax Losses and Credits (BTtax)
To e timate gains from use of tax losses and credits, information concerning, for example, the tax loss carry forward and investment tax credit carry
fornard of the company, is required. These data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and 10-K's for one year prior to the announcement year. We use
the \ alue of the actual tax loss of both bidder and target as the potential
benefit for parents.
This stud} ignores the additional restrictions that might apply to the full
use of benefits in particular cases because of the inability to identify such
cases.

2. Basis Step-up (Tstep)
For target firm property, plant and equipment, the total step-up amount
i, the difference bet\\een the current cost (replacement cost) and adjusted
bases.
By definition, replacement cost 1s the dollar outlay needed to purchase the
current producme capacity of the firm at minimum cost and with the most
modern technolog) available.
Current cost (replacement cost) data are from 10-K filings. In 1976, the
SEC began requmng large companies to disclose replacement-cost data on
their 10-K filings. Hasbrouck ( 1985) suggests the limitations of 1hese requirements. Fir l, 1he rule applies only 10 relatively large firms. The SEC rule
requires replacement value report10g only for those firms wi1h invenwries
and gross plan! and equipment 10 excess of $100 million. Furthermore, the
report10g requirements do not cover all replacement costs. Under the SEC
rule, a company 1s only required to compu1e the replacement value of i1s
· ·producti\e capacity," that is, assets that would be consumed in 1he course
of operation and would normally be replaced. Land and mineral holdings
\\ere generally not subJect to this disclosure requirement. Finally, the reported
replacement cost data are not audited, and judging from the warnings tha1
1ypically accompany their presentation, management confidence in the estimate is not high (p. 357). Each of these considerations may lead to biases
in the analysis.
For the firms which do not report replacement cost, we apply an algorithm
10 obtain an esuma1e. Value line is consulted for an estimate of the average
age of the plant. In the case of companies whose average age is not reported
10 Value Line, we estimate the age as 1 = (accumulated depreciation) / (cu~rent depreciation expense). The replacement value for net plant is then esumated by restating the reported net plant using the consumer price index:
(net plant, replacement value)1 = (net plant, book value)1 X (CP J/CPl,.1)·
The replacement value of inventory is generally taken as the book valu~ if
the reported method is FIFO or retail, which is approximately correct prov,d-
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ed inventory turnover is not too slow. Firms that used L_IFO valuation al~o
reported a LIFO reserve, which is added to the reported 111ventory to obta111
the equiva lent FIFO value.
3. Tobin's q Ratio (Bq)
Tobin 's q ratio is the market-to-replacement cost ratio. The calculation
o f q requires separate calculations fo r replacement cost, in addition LO the
calculation of the market value of assets. Both variables are discussed above
Jn additio n, as d o many other studies, we use the market-to-book ra110 as
an alternative proxy of the q ratio.
The two ratios are highly correlated and, as a result, they are generally
interchangeable in cross-sectional studies.
4. Bidder Target Combined Profit (BTprofit)

This variable is measured as the bidder and the target' comb111ed pre-tax
income, which is operating and nonopera11ng income before prov1s1ons for
income taxes. We assigned zero for negative pre-tax income.
Endnotes
1There may be other kinds of tax benefits obtained 111 acqu1s1t1ons.
However, we focus on these two types of benefits which provide the greater
tax ramification.
2Recently Hayn (1989) has taken a tack, different from our<, and the
previous literature, and separated acqu1sitiom into mergers (primarily carryovers) and tender offers (primarily cash acquisH1ons) and found that within each group the size of the related tax benefit affects the hold111g penod
returns around the acquisition announcement. However, this does not directly
answer the question of the relal!\'e value of the two types of benefits and
how they affect the choice of payment medium.
1

The probability of the bidder's choice of stock exchange may increase
with the target shareholders' capital ga111s because the target's shareholders
require compensation for the cash payment to the extent which they pay capital gains tax. However, the difficulty in measuring the personal tax liabi lity
which is determined by the amount of capital gains and the ta'\ rate of hareholders is an obstacle in verifyi ng the hypothesis [Niden ( 1988) tested this
hypothesis by employing the target 's cumulative returns du ring pre-acquisition
period a nd the target's dividend yield].
4

While the transaction itself is nontaxable , the target corporation may
have to pay taxes o n depreciatio n recapture and gains o n LIFO val ued in~entories. The target corpo ratio n may a lso have to recapture a portion o f
mvestment tax credits used.
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lWhile §332 transactions, granting a stepped-up a~set basis to the acquiring corporation, are generally considered cash for stock transaction, the form
of payment is not specified. Therefore, such transactions by definition would
qualify under §368(a)(l )(B) (Type B reorganiLatlon), granting a carryover
a set basis to the acquiring corporation, if stock was the medium of payment. However, §368(a)(l)(B) is generally paramount to §332. See the Stock
for Stock section of the paper for the related discussion.
6When a parent is liquidating a subsidiary under §332, only the parent's
hare of the liquidation is tax-free to the sub!>1d1ari. \1monty interest liquidations trigger taxable income recognition.
'Up to 50 percent of the purchase price ot the assets may be paid with
boot (cash or property other than stock) for Type C reorganizations, while
any use of boot disqualifies a Type B reorganization from tax-free treatment.
SThe question of which type 1s the most desirable for a particular acquisition depends on many tax fact0rs as well as nontax factors such as the continuity of interest requirement, the presence of boot m a transaction,
shareholders' appro\al requirement, dissenting shareholders' treatment, and
so on.
'ffhere are other tax benefit carryovers but the three mentioned
are the ones providing the greatest benefits
10Section 382(b) partially or \\holl, d1minate the
corporation involved 111 a §368 reorganization.

111

the text

OL carryover of a loss

11 A detailed description of hO\~ to measure tax benefit~ 1s presented in the
Appendix.

12The ne,\ rule of TRA 86 applies to hqu1datmg distributions and sales
of appreciated property made after 7 3 l / 86. But exemptions are granted in
all liquidations completed before I I 87, or hqu1dat1on that are completed
before 1/ 1/ 88, if the liquidation plans were adopted before 8 I 86. Thus,
the sample includes acquisitions occurred before 8 I 86.
13 This study considers a combination of cash and debt securities payment
as an all-cash offer, and a combination of common stock and preferred stock
as an all-stock offer.

. 14There are 61 acquired firms which report their replacement coStS. fortyfive (16) of them are acquired with cash (stock).
A test of the hypothesis H0: (Ji = [J3 = . . . = {J~ = o can be carried
out using the likelihood ratio procedure. If n is the number of successes
15

-
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(Y; = J) observed in the T observations,_ the_n for both t~e Iogit and probit
models the maximum value of the log-hkehhood function under the null
hypothesis H 0 is
In I(w) = n In (n/ T) + (t - n) In [T- n) T]
Consequently, if the hypothesis is true, then asymptotically
- 2[1n l(w) - In l(Q)]
has a x2<k-l) distribution, where In l(Q) is the value of the log-likel!hood
function evaluated at {J. Investigators are also frequent !:,, mterestcd m the
scalar nature of model performance, uch as R 2 is for the linear model. T\\O
popular ones are the value of the chi-square statistics m the abo\e and the
pseudo-R2, defined as
T2 = I - In I (Q)/ln l(w)
This measure is I when the model 1s a perfect predictor, m the sense that
P•- F(x,'/3) = I when} = I and P, = 0, and is O \\hen In l(Q) = In I(\\).
16Since we expect that BTta, does not affect the choice of pa) mcnt
method, it seems reasonable to e,clude BTta, in the log11 analysis Therefore, we ran the logistic regression \\llhout mcluding BTtax, but the outcomes are basically the same.
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